ABOUT THE WORK
Martin
Weibel
Regulatory Impacts on
Financial Intermediation: Insights from Martin's Research Papers
2023
Martin
currently have four working papers and one advanced work in progress on topics
related to financial services and financial intermediation within an
international context.
In Martins
first and main paper he study the cross-sectional effects of Basel regulations
on dealer intermediation in the U.S. corporate bond market. Using intra-quarter
variation in the intensity of Basel regulatory requirements, Martin document pronounced
inventory contractions when regulatory pressure rises near quarter- ends. In
contrast to their behavior in shortterm money markets, U.S. bank dealers do not
absorb regulatory selling pressure in corporate bonds. Instead, bank dealers direct
their selling primarily to nonbank financial intermediaries. In doing so, they
fall back on their investor networks to offload investment grade bonds and
their nonbank dealer networks to dispose of high-yield bonds. In the aggregate,
leverage regulations impair liquidity conditions in the corporate bond market,
specifically in balance sheet intensive trades where regulatory shadow costs
amount up to 20%. Martins findings have implications for the design of future
regulation of both bank and non- bank financial intermediaries.
In Martins
second paper, he show that following the introduction of regulatory constraints
on bank-affiliated dealers, bond mutual funds have started engaging in more
liquidity provision and that the performance of funds with liquidity-supplying strategies
has benefitted. Not only have regulations transferred profits associated with
liquidity provision in the bond market to bond mutual funds, but the liquidity
and returns of corporate bonds have become more exposed to redemptions from the
bond mutual fund industry, suggesting that the regulations may have made the
corporate bond market more volatile.
In Martins
third paper, he investigate both the magnitude and the drivers of bank window
dressing behavior in euro-denominated repo markets. Using a confidential
transaction-level dataset, our analysis illustrates that banks engineer an
economically sizeable contraction in their repo transactions around regulatory
reporting dates. Martin establish a causal link between these reductions and
banks’ incentives to window dress and document the role of the leverage ratio
and the G-SIB framework as the most relevant drivers of window dressing
behavior.
In Martins
fourth paper, he uncover a robust positive relationship between a bank’s share
of retained mortgages and subsequent bank performance. This relation is
time-varying and depends on the business cycle: during crises, when house
prices decline and delinquencies increase, high-retained-share banks report
higher profitability than other banks.